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Comments
Fame and Notoriety in Defamation Litigation
Since the landmark decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan'
abolished libel's "talismanic immunity from constitutional limita-
tions," 2 the United States Supreme Court has struggled to develop an
analytical structure that will properly protect each of the conflicting
interests involved in all defamation cases. On one side is the individ-
ual's interest in maintaining his or her good reputation, the historical
basis for the defamation action.3 On the other is the first amendment
interest in the" maintenance of freedom of expression and an active and
unfettered press.4
The decade following the Times case found the Court in disagree-
ment as to the scope of first amendment protection in defamation cases.
The protection granted in the Times case to criticism of official behav-
ior was first extended to public figures.5 In 1971, a plurality decision
extended protection to all comment pertaining to matters of public con-
cern.6 In 1974, however, a majority of the Court rejected this position.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,7 the Court developed a test that
focuses upon the status of the plaintiff, in an effort to assure that the
state interest in protecting the reputation of the individual is given suf-
ficient weight. Under the Gertz standard, a plaintiff who is a public
figure must meet the burden of the Times standard.
8
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In the Times case, the Supreme Court held that the first
amendment prohibits states from allowing public officials to recover damages for a defama-
tory statement relating to their official conduct unless they can prove that the statement was
made with knowledge or reckless disregard of the statement's falsity. Id. at 279-80.
2. Id. at 269.
3. See L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 2 (1978); W. PROSSER, THE LAW
OF TORTS 737-39 (4th ed. 1971).
4. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
5. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); see also infra note 24.
6. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See infra notes 35-36 & ac-
companying text.
7. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
8. Id. at 342. This Comment will refer to the standard enunciated in the Times case as
the Times standard, rather than use the term "actual malice," a term that has caused confu-
sion and threatens the proper application of the rule by juries. See Rosenbloom v. Me-
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The Gertz opinion enumerated three categories of potential public
figure plaintiffs: (1) those who achieve pervasive fame or notoriety and
are therefore public figures for all purposes; (2) those who have thrust
themselves into a public controversy and thereby become public figures
for a limited range of issues connected with that controversy; and
(3) those who have been involuntarily thrust into a public controversy
and thereby become public figures. 9
The Gertz case allows public figure status to be conferred on a
plaintiff solely on the basis of his or her notoriety. The language of the
opinion is unclear regarding the amount of fame required, whether the
reasons for such fame must be related to the defamatory comment, and
whether there is any limitation imposed by the privacy rights of such a
plaintiff.
An analysis of the rationale offered by the Gertz Court as support
for the adoption of a public figure standard reveals support only for a
narrow application of the all-purpose public figure concept.' 0 In addi-
tion, Supreme Court cases after Gertz have interpreted the limited pur-
pose category in such a manner as to cast further doubt upon the
continuing vitality of a public figure based solely on fame.1' However,
lower courts continue to apply such a standard.
Because of the lack of Supreme Court guidance regarding the
scope of the all-purpose category, lower courts have not reached consis-
tent results. Indeed, the decisions have been essentially ad hoc, a result
Gertz was expressly intended to prevent. 12
This Comment addresses the need for a more defined standard
governing the role of fame or notoriety in defamation cases. It first
examines the development of the public figure category and the
Supreme Court decisions prior to Gertz, and then analyzes the Gertz
decision in light of several leading first amendment theories, conclud-
ing that a broad all-purpose public figure category is not necessary to
tromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 52 n.18 (1971). This standard requires that the plaintiff present
"sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publication with such doubts shows reckless disre-
gard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 731 (1968).
9. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 351.
10. The basic categories of public figures are derived from Justice Powell's opinion in
Gertz, in which he distinguishes between those public figures who "achieve such pervasive
fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts," id. at
351, and those who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controver-
sies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved," id. at 435.
11. See infra notes 124-26 & accompanying text.
12. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 343-44.
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protect first amendment interests. The post-Gertz Supreme Court in-
terpretations of the limited-purpose category are examined, and it is
concluded that the scope of that category has been narrowed by the
Court's increasing emphasis on voluntary action by the plaintiff.
The Comment concludes that a broadly interpreted all-purpose
category poses a danger of unwarranted infringements of privacy rights
and of inconsistent results. Because this area of law requires consistent
and predictable adjudication, this Comment suggests that the determi-
nation of public figure status be made by focusing on the actual activi-
ties of the plaintiff. If the defamatory comment pertains to activities
the plaintiff has placed before the public, such comment should receive
first amendment protection. If the comment is not reasonably related
to the voluntary activities of the plaintiff, recovery should be allowed
under standards applicable to private figures. Such a test would pro-
vide more predictability and would effectively protect the state interests
in defamation cases without any further infringement of first amend-
ment interests.
Genesis-The Times Case and Its Progeny
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'3 decided in 1964, was the first
case to hold that defamatory speech is included within the ambit of first
amendment protection. The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored
by Justice Brennan, held that the first amendment, as applied to the
states by the fourteenth amendment, prohibits states from allowing
public officials14 to recover damages for defamatory falsehoods relating
to their official conduct unless they can prove the statements were made
with knowledge or reckless disregard of the statement's falsity.1
5
The case involved a suit brought by the police commissioner of
Montgomery, Alabama, against the New York Times for the printing of
allegedly defamatory statements in an advertisement protesting the de-
nial of civil rights to blacks in the South. Considering the case "against
the background of a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
13. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
14. The term "public official" is not limited to elected officials. The "public official
designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees
who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the
conduct of government affairs." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). Candidates for
public office are also included within the "public figure" designation. See Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
15. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
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open... ,"16 the Court noted that "erroneous statement is inevitable
in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expres-
sion are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need. . .to survive'
.... 17 Analogizing the criticism of official conduct to seditious libel,
the Court stated that it was the controversy over the Sedition Act of
179818 that had first crystallized the nation's awareness of the "central
meaning of the First Amendment." 19 The fear of large damage awards
would markedly inhibit such criticism.20
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Walker v. Associated Press ,2 1 de-
cided together in 1967, extended constitutional protection to defama-
tory statements pertaining to "public figures." Butts involved a
Saturday Evening Post article accusing Wally Butts, the athletic direc-
tor of the University of Georgia, of conspiring to fix a football game.22
Walker concerned a news dispatch describing Walker, a former Army
general who had been involved in previous segregation confrontations,
as personally having led a crowd in a charge against federal marshals
in an attempt to block the enrollment of James Meredith in the Univer-
sity of Mississippi.23
The Court found both Butts and Walker to be public figures. Six
Justices agreed that some form of protection should be afforded to de-
famatory statements when the plaintiff is a public figure, although they
disagreed about the proper standard to be applied.24 Justice Harlan
16. Id. at 270.
17. Id. at 271-72.
18. Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). The Sedition Act made it a crime, punishable by a fine
of $5,000 or five years imprisonment to utter defamatory comment about the government of
the United States, either house of Congress, or the President. The defense of truth was
allowed and the jury decided questions of both law and fact. New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. at 273-74. The Act expired by its terms in 1801. Although never tested in the
Court, it was widely regarded as inconsistent with the first amendment and therefore uncon-
stitutional. See id. at 276.
19. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 273.
20. Id. at 277. The Court noted that the damage awards allowed by the Alabama
courts were one hundred times greater than the maximum fine provided by the Sedition Act,
and one thousand times greater than that provided by the Alabama criminal libel statute.
Id.
21. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
22. Id. at 135 (Harlan, J.). Butts had been a popular head football coach at the univer-
sity, and was in the process of negotiating for a position with a professional team. Id. at 135-
36.
23. Id. at 140. Walker was a private citizen at the time, but previously had com-
manded federal troops during the school desegregation confrontation in Little Rock, Arkan-
sas, in 1957. He resigned his army position to engage in political activity, and made several
well-publicized statements against federal intervention in desegregation efforts. Id.
24. Four Justices in Butts would have held that a public figure may recover upon a
showing of "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the stan-
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felt that two similarities between public figures and public officials jus-
tified imposition of constitutional safeguards on state libel actions in-
volving public figures: "[B]oth commanded sufficient public interest
and had sufficient access to the means of counterargument to be able
'to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies' of the defam-
atory statements. '25 Justice Harlan also noted that courts had ex-
amined the prior activities of defamation plaintiffs to determine if
recovery was warranted. 26 Justice Harlan concluded that Butts had at-
tained public figure status on the basis of his position alone, while
Walker attained it through a purposeful thrusting of his personality
into a public controversy.27
Chief Justice Warren also concluded that both Walker and Butts
were public figures. He focused on the pervasive involvement of pri-
vate citizens in the resolution of important public questions, and de-
clared that the press must be free to comment on the involvement of
such figures in public issues and events. 28
The public figure concept was but vaguely outlined in Butts and
Walker; there was no definition more specific than a statement that
both Butts and Walker would be considered public figures under ordi-
nary tort rules.29 For this proposition Justice Harlan cited Spahn v. Ju-
lian Messner, Inc. ,30 a privacy case. Thus the "ordinary tort rules" to
which he referred apparently were those governing a qualified privilege
in privacy actions. Two closely related privileges available to defend-
ants in such actions are the privileges to give further publicity to public
figures and to give publicity to matters of public interest.3 1 "The one
primarily concerns the person to whom the publicity was given; the
other the event, fact or subject matter in which he was involved. They
dards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. at
155.
Chief Justice Warren, on the other hand, saw no reason in "law, logic, or First Amend-
ment policy" to differentiate between public figures and public officials, and would have
applied the Times standard to both. Id. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring). His opinion
was joined in both cases by Justices White and Brennan, and in Walker by Justices Black
and Douglas. Thus, in Walker, a majority of the Court voted in favor of applying the Times
standard to public figures. See Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment, 1967
Sup. CT. REv. 267, 277-78.
25. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 155 (Harlan, J.).
26. Id. at 154.
27. Id. at 155.
28. Id. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
29. Id. at 154.
30. 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 387 U.S. 239 (1967).
31. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 823.
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are, however, obviously only different phases of the same thing, and in
practice frequently became so merged as to be inseparable.
32
The stress placed by both Chief Justice Warren and Justice Harlan
upon the involvement of matters of public interest and Justice Harlan's
reference to "ordinary tort rules" shed some light both on the scope of
protection intended to be offered to critics of public figures and on the
Court's view of the interests involved. The use of a privacy standard
strongly suggests that the Court had no intention of extending constitu-
tional protection to comment on the private aspects of life.33 In addi-
tion, Chief Justice Warren's concern that the press be free to comment
upon the involvement of public figures in public issues and events indi-
cates a primary concern with the rights of the press to inform the pub-
lic, and of the public to be informed.34 The concern of the Court at the
time of Butts and Walker was with the requirements of the first amend-
ment rather than the interests of the parties.
During the eight years following Butts the Court continued to
struggle with the problem of first amendment application in defama-
tion cases. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. ,35 a plurality opinion by
Justice Brennan extended protection to all utterances involving matters
of public interest or concern.36 The plurality rejected the notion that
the Times standard should apply only to public officials and public
figures:
Drawing a distinction between 'public' and 'private' figures makes no
sense in terms of First Amendment guarantees. The New York
Times standard was applied to libel of a public official or public
figure to give effect to the Amendment's function to encourage venti-
lation of public issues, not because the public official has any less
interest in protecting his reputation than an individual in private
32. Id.
33. See Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1393 (1975) (Butts expanded the
privilege to protect communications about public personalities "with respect to public issues
and events"); see also id. at 1393 n. 184.
34. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 164-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
35. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Rosenbloom, a private citizen not previously in the public eye,
was arrested for selling allegedly obscene books. A local radio station broadcast a news
account linking his name with a "smut literature racket" and with "girlie-book peddlers."
Id. at 34-35.
36. Id. at 43 ("If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly
become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the
individual did not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is
in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and
significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety."). The opin-
ion by Justice Brennan was joined only by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun.
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This extension of protection, however, was shortlived. Three years
later a majority of the Court held that the Rosenbloom standard inade-
quately balanced the competing values at stake in defamation cases by
abridging the state interest in protecting reputation to an unacceptable
degree.
The Gertz Decision and the Pubfic Figure
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 38 the Court, by a 5-4 majority,39
rejected the Rosenbloom standard in favor of a test focusing on the
status of the plaintiff. Gertz, an attorney, had been retained by the
family of a murder victim to represent them in a civil suit against a
Chicago police officer who was later convicted of the murder. Ameri-
can Opinion, a John Birch Society publication, accused Gertz of ar-
ranging a frame-up and of being a "Communist fronter." The article
also falsely implied that Gertz had a criminal record.4°
The Court expressly repudiated the Rosenbloom standard,41 con-
cluding that imposition of the stringent Times standard upon private
plaintiffs would seriously abridge the legitimate state interest in com-
pensating individuals who have been harmed by defamatory com-
ment.42 While adhering to the application of the Times standard in
cases involving public officials and public figures, the Court concluded
that application of the Times standard was not required when the
plaintiff is a private individual.43 The Court did not declare what rule
should be used, but held that "so long as they do not impose liability
without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory false-
37. Id. at 45-46.
38. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
39. Justice Blackmun, who joined Justice Brennan's opinion in Rosenbloom, neverthe-
less concurred in the majority opinion in Gertz, stating that though he sensed some illogic in
the opinion it was necessary to decide the issue raised in Gertz by a majority opinion to
eliminate the ongoing confusion caused by the many plurality opinions. .d. at 353-54.
40. Id. at 325-26.
41. Id. at 346.
42. Id. That the application of the Times standard has a decided effect on the outcome
of litigation is shown by a study of defamation cases decided between 1976 and mid-1979.
Of 66 appeals in which the court applied the Times standard, 47 (71%) were resolved in
favor of the defendant and only 5 (8%) were resolved in favor of the plaintiffs. In cases
involving media defendants, the defendants won 34 of 44 cases. When the Gertz standard
was applied to media defendants, however, II of 14 cases were resolved in favor of the
plaintiff. Franklin, Winners and Losers and Wy: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980
AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 455, 492-93.
43. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 343.
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hood injurious to a private individual."44
Justice Powell's opinion set forth three categories of public figures:
Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public
figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of
truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare. For the
most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial
prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such
persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures
or all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures
have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public contro-
versies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In
either event, they invite attention and comment.4
5
The scope of the all-purpose category is not clearly defined in the
Gertz opinion. There is language that suggests the category may be
quite broad. From parts of the opinion it appears that a person can
become an all-purpose public figure on the basis of "pervasive fame,"
with no actual, voluntary attempt to influence the resolution of public
controversies.46 The opinion also appears to allow comment upon all
aspects of such a figure's life;47 protection is not limited to comment
pertaining to activities for which the plaintiff is famous.
48
44. 1d. at 347.
45. Id. at 345.
46. Although there is language in Gertz that appears to require "persuasive power and
influence," id., some lower courts have interpreted Gertz to allow a finding of public figure
status based solely on fame. See, e.g., Brewer v. Memphis Pub. Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1255
(5th Cir. 1980) (former "girlfriend" of Elvis Presley a public figure at least to the extent of
her involvement with Presley on the basis of fame); Carson v. Allied News, 529 F.2d 206,
209-10 (7th Cir. 1976) (Johnny Carson and his second wife public figures based on his fame
in television); Steere v. Cupp, 226 Kan. 566, 602 P.2d 1267 (1979) (local attorney held to be
an all-purpose public figure on basis of country-wide fame). Cf. Chuy v. Philadelphia Ea-
gles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1280 (3d Cir. 1979) (court appears to use pervasive fame
as basis for concluding plaintiff was limited-purpose public figure).
47. "In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that
he becomes a public figure for all purposes andin all contexts." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added). Lower courts have at times found a plaintiffs fame
enough to justify affording protection to comment referring to areas of life traditionally
protected by privacy rights or to areas unrelated to the cause of plaintiff's fame. See infra
text accompanying notes 146-58.
48. This possibility was noted by Justice Brennan in Rosenbloom. In arguing that the
proper focus of a constitutional standard should be the event rather than the people in-
volved, Justice Brennan referred to Walker: "Walker also illustrates another anomaly of
focusing analysis on the public "figure" or "official" status of the individual involved. Gen-
eral Walker's fame stemmed from events completely unconnected with the episode in Mis-
sissippi. It seems particularly unsatisfactory to determine the extent of First Amendment
protection on the basis of factors completely unrelated to the newsworthy events being re-
ported." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 n. 11. The plurality opinion in
Rosenbloom, which extended protection to all speech pertinent to matters of public interest,
noted that some aspects of the lives of even the most public of men were outside the realm of
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The Court noted two major characteristics that justify the distinc-
tion between private and public figures. First, public figures usually
have a greater ability to rebut the defamatory publication because of
their "greater access to the channels of effective communication."
49
Second, the Court reasoned, one who is a public figure has assumed the
risks that are associated with that status, entitling one "to act on the
assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily ex-
posed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood
concerning them."50
Under the logic of Rosenbloom, protection of comment upon mat-
ters of public interest was required in order that the first amendment
may properly function.5 ' The Gertz Court rejected any test of public
interest as a proper determinant of when protection was needed, prefer-
ring to examine the actions of the plaintiff52 In defining the nature of
the public figure concept, however, the Court retained a public interest
test for the all-purpose category. The use of fame as a basis for apply-
ing the Times standard requires an examination of the amount of inter-
est the public has in the activities of the plaintiff, but it does not require
analysis of the extent to which the plaintiff, through voluntary action,
has actually invited such interest. It may be that the Court felt a need
to retain some of the Rosenbloom standard, but in a more limited
form.53 The Court did not articulate such a need, however, and a care-
ful examination of first amendment theory indicates that a broad stan-
dard based on the fame of the plaintiff is not required to protect first
amendment interests.
public concern. Id. at 48. In the view of the plurality, at least the areas of life protected by
the constitutional right of privacy are outside the range of protected speech. Id. This view
was also expressed by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Gertz. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. at 364. See Note, Public Figures, Private Figures and Private Interest, 30 STAN. L.
Rnv. 157, 174-75 (1977).
49. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 345.
50. Id. at 344.
51. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41-43 (1971).
52. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 345-46. The rejection of the Rosenbloom
public interest standard has been repeated in most of the Supreme Court's public figure
cases since Gertz. See infra notes 101, 118 & accompanying text.
53. The allowance by the Court that one might become a public figure, in rare circum-
stances, through no purposeful action leaves open the possibility that involvement with an
event of great public interest may result in public figure status. This possibility seems to
have been foreclosed by later decisions, however. See infra notes 106-19 & accompanying
text. The only other circumstances under which one might become an involuntary public
figure would seem to be when the plaintiff is famous for reasons unrelated to any purposeful
activities of the plaintiff, a situation also covered by the all-purpose category. In either situ-
ation, the finding of public figure status will be a function of the amount of interest the
public has in the event or the plaintiffs activities.
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Libel and the First Amendment
The Supreme Court has never adopted a single, uniform theory of
the first amendment.5 4 Different values have been emphasized, and
different standards applied, in different types of cases.- The lack of a
consistent theoretical basis for decision has been apparent in the libel
cases, which are remarkable for the number of plurality decisions, con-
curring opinions and dissents.5 6
The Times decision led some observers to conclude that a consis-
tent first amendment approach was being developed, 7 but the deci-
sions following Times showed that the Court was not in agreement
regarding the proper interpretation of the Times case. A split devel-
oped between those Justices who saw the key to the Times decision in
its emphasis on protection of speech on public issues,58 and those who
thought the key was the analogy to seditious libel, and thus protection
of criticism of official conduct.5 9
The fragmentation of the court in Rosenbloom resulted from these
differing perceptions of the proper role of the first amendment in libel
cases. Justice Brennan, the author of the Times opinion, viewed the
Times standard as essential to the functioning of the first amendment.
Freedom of discussion on public issues is necessary to ensure that the
54. See Bevier, The First Amendment and Political Speech. An Inquiry Into the Sub-
stance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Blasi, The Checking Value in
FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUN. RESEARCH J. 521, 526; Bork, Neutral Principles
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971); Brennan, The Supreme Court
and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1963);
Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time- First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel
and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 935-48 (1968).
55. The tests that have been utilized in freedom of speech cases have not been given
across-the-board application. Each has been primarily utilized in a specific area: the "re-
deeming social value" test has been applied primarily in obscenity cases; the "clear and
present danger" test in regulation of subversive activity; and the "balancing" test primarily
in regulation that does not directly condemn the content of speech, but incidentally inhibits
it. Brennan, supra note 54, at 11.
56. Butts, Walker, and Rosenbloom were plurality decisions. The Gertz opinion com-
manded a full majority only because of Justice Blackmun's view that a majority was re-
quired to eliminate the uncertainty caused by these decisions. See Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. at 353-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
57. See Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy.- The Supreme Court Justice And
The Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41 (1974); Kalven, The New York Times Case. A Note
on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment, " 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191.
58. See, e.g., Justice Brennan's opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.
29 (1971).
59. See, e.g., Justice Harlan's opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
(1967).
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public has access to information needed to make informed decisions.60
In Justice Brennan's view, the press can adequately provide this infor-
mation only if it is free of the fear of damage awards whenever com-
ment is directed at issues of public concern.6'
Justices Harlan and Marshall, on the other hand, viewed the
Times case in a different light. In their opinion, the Times standard is
appropriate as an accomodation of two conflicting, but important, in-
terests only when the comment involved is analogous to criticism of
official conduct.62 Thus, the Times standard is proper when public
figures are involved because such individuals, like public officials, have
surrendered some of their interest in not being defamed.63 While Jus-
tice Brennan's standard looks to the interest that the standard is in-
tended to protect, Justices Harlan and Marshall look to the conduct of
the plaintiff to determine whether he or she has to some extent waived
the personal interest in reputation.
Whether the protected value is speech on public issues or speech
which is critical of government, it does not appear that the all-purpose
public figure category would be an effective vehicle for insuring that
protection. If speech on public issues is protected, the focus would nat-
urally be on the subject of the speech, not on the status of the plaintiff.
If criticism of government is the crux of the issue, the focus would logi-
cally be on whether the plaintiff has been involved in the resolution of
political and governmental issues. The question, then, is whether Gertz
identifies any further first amendment values that the all-purpose cate-
gory protects.
It is unclear from the Gertz opinion what values played a part in
the majority holding. The first amendment interest is characterized
only as "[t]he need to avoid self-censorship by the news media." 4 No
attempt was made to explain the majority's conclusions in terms of a
theory of the first amendment.
The fact that the Court did not expressly articulate a new theoreti-
cal basis for the decision, however, may not be conclusive. "To all but
the most casual observer it is obvious that, in first amendment cases,
courts have tended to change their rationales more slowly than their
60. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. at 41-44.
61. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 365-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. at 62-72 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id.
at 78-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 70-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
64. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 341.
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conduct." 65 The all-purpose public figure may serve to protect a first
amendment interest that was not articulated in Gertz.66 Such an inter-
est, however, is not apparent from an examination of leading first
amendment theories.
Self-Government
One first amendment theory which has particular application to
the libel area was developed by the late Professor Alexander
Meiklejohn. The premise of this theory is that the first amendment
protects those activities of thought and communication that enable us
to govern ourselves. 67 Such activities include political activities, educa-
tion, philosophy, the sciences, literature, the arts, and public discussion
of all public issues. 68 These activities are absolutely protected by the
first amendment.69
Professor Meiklejohn applied his theory to the problem of defama-
tory speech:
The principle here at stake can be seen in our libel laws. In cases of
private defamation, one individual does damage to another by
tongue or pen; the person so injured in reputation or property may
sue for damages. But, in that case, the First Amendment gives no
protection to the person sued. His verbal attack has no relation to
the business of governing. If, however, the same verbal attack is
made in order to show the unfitness of a candidate for governmental
office, the act is properly regarded as a citizen's participation in gov-
ernment. It is, therefore, protected by the First Amendment ...
Though private libel is subject to legislative control, political or sedi-
tious libel is not. 70
It is not surprising that many saw the influence of Professor Meiklejohn
in the Times case,71 with its emphasis on protection of speech on public
65. Note, Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GA. L. REV. 867, 882
(1972).
66. The extent to which Gertz can be said to reflect a change in the Court's perception
of the first amendment is a matter of some debate. Compare Blasi, supra note 54, at 573
("the lengthy, careful majority opinion in Gertz is most distinctive for its failure to make any
contribution to First Amendment thinking; its lines are drawn almost exclusively in terms of
perceived differences in the strengths of the various regulatory interests.") and Bevier, supra
note 54, at 352 with Eaton, supra note 33, at 1415 ("Although the majority never expressly
reinterpreted the meaning of the first amendment and, in fact, purported merely to balance
the competing interests within the framework of the New York Times theory of coverage of
the amendment, the result of remaking state defamation law in the area of speech which is
of no public interest is necessarily a reinterpretation of the first amendment.").
67. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment iv an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 255.
68. Id. at 256-57.
69. Id. at 256.
70. Id. at 259.
71. See Blasi, supra note 54, at 567-71; Kalven, supra note 57, at 221.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34
issues and the analogy to seditious libel.
There is room in Professor Meiklejohn's model for the concept of
a public figure, but such a figure would have to be "someone the public
has an unlimited right to hear about . . . as a necessity of their in-
formed consent as governors."' 72 A famous person who is involved in
public affairs would be the subject of protected speech. In Professor
Meiklejohn's model, however, it is not the fame of the plaintiff that is
the key, but the public's need for the information, and the protection
extended is limited to areas of public concern.73
The Speech/Action Dichotomy
Professor Thomas I. Emerson has developed a theory of freedom
of expression in which a fundamental distinction is made between con-
duct constituting "expression" and conduct constituting "'action.
' 74
The root purpose of the first amendment is to assure that expression is
effectively protected, and any rules of law must be based upon this
function. Expression is, therefore, absolutely protected. Action may be
controlled by the government, but not by the control of expression.
75
The government may advance other social interests through regulation
of action, but may not balance the interest in freedom of expression
against such social interests.76
Professor Emerson views libel laws as being, for the most part,
fatally antagonistic to freedom of expression. He would allow protec-
tion of reputation from expression only when it impinges upon privacy
rights protected by the Constitution. Emerson would draw the bounda-
ries of this right narrowly, and freedom of expression would be limited
only where the communication discloses information that touches the
inner core of personality.77
The design of Professor Emerson's system precludes the need to
examine the status of the plaintiff. If the speech involved is directed at
any aspect of life except for the narrow area protected by the right of
privacy, it is absolutely protected. If it is directed at matters which are
72. Bloustein, supra note 57, at 56.
73. Id. A good example of this distinction is found in the publicity surrounding the
involvement of Senator Kennedy in the Chappaquidick incident. Speech regarding that
incident would be protected because it relates to Senator Kennedy's ability to perform his
functions as a Senator. Speech regarding the private life of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis
would not be protected, though she is equally well-known.
74. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREsSION 17 (1970).
75. Id. at 19.
76. Id. at 529.
77. Id. at 562.
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wholly personal and intimate in nature, the status of the plaintiff does
not affect the protection given by the constitutional right of privacy. 78
The Marketplace of Ideas
The view that diversity of ideas is a central value protected by the
first amendment is apparent in many first amendment cases. 79 The no-
tion that the clash of ideas is essentially a self-correcting process had
perhaps its most powerful exposition in Justice Holmes' dissent in
Abrams v. United States:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foun-
dations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas--that the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,
and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can
be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. 80
It is possible that the emphasis placed on access to the press by the
Gertz Court is based on a desire to encourage such competition of
ideas. 81 It may be that the Court wishes to prevent self-censorship by
the press because of the adverse effect that self-censorship would have
on the marketplace of ideas. But it is not clear that focusing upon the
fame of the plaintiff will further such a value.
Access to the press may be a more important factor in the case of a
well-known plaintiff than in the case of a limited-purpose public figure,
since the well-known person is likely to command more press interest,
and because there is less of a voluntary assumption of the risk of defa-
mation where the plaintiff has not thrust himself or herself to the fore-
front of a public controversy.
It has been suggested that the "general notoriety" test for the all-
purpose public figure approximates the Butts test of whether the plain-
tiff has access to the press, "since general notoriety in modem society
results almost exclusively from past media access and exposure. '82 In
Butts, access to the press was viewed as important because it enabled
the defamed plaintiff" 'to expose through discussion the falsehood and
78. Id.
79. See Blasi, supra note 54, at 548-54.
80. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 377 (1926) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
81. See Blasi, supra note 54, at 569-70.
82. Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REv. 199, 224 (1976).
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fallacies of the defamatory statement." 83 Perhaps the Gertz Court be-
lieved that a person of renown, with ready access to the press, has
enough ability to remedy evil portrayals with good ones so that the
need for the protection of the state is not as compelling. While such an
argument would be consistent with the idea that exposure of fallacies
and falsehoods by speech is preferable to the remedy of punishing
speech, 84 it necessarily assumes that a plaintiff with the ability to re-
spond is somehow less damaged by the defamatory statement. The
Gertz opinion itself, however, acknowledged that rebuttal is not a suffi-
cient remedy in defamation cases.85 In any event, the slight considera-
tion given to access to the press in subsequent libel decisions by the
Court indicates that a marketplace theory of the first amendment plays
little part in the Court's current libel theory.
8 6
Whether or not Gertz marked a change in first amendment think-
ing, it would appear that first amendment interests are not advanced by
a broad all-purpose category. If predicating imposition of the Times
standard on the fame or notoriety of the plaintiff is to be justified, it
must be justified on the basis of the state interests involved. Close ex-
amination, however, shows that the all-purpose category does nothing
to further the reputational interests that so concerned the Gertz Court,
and in some cases may serve to abridge the state interest in protecting
privacy rights.
The Post-Gertz Cases and the Nature of the State Interests
The Gertz Court attempted to develop "broad rules of general ap-
plication 87 that would properly balance the competing interests at
stake.88 As the Court saw it, two factors distinguish a private individ-
83. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 155 (Harlan, J.) (quoting Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1926) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
84. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1926) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
85. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974).
86. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). Mrs. Firestone held several
press conferences concerning the subject of the alleged defamatory comments (her divorce),
but the Court gave no weight to this factor. 1d. at 454-55 n.3.
87. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 343-44.
88. The type of balancing done in Gertz has been called "definitional balancing." The
balancing by the Court was transformed into a general rule that can be employed in future
cases without the need for ad hoc weighing of interests by lower courts. The status of the
plaintiff, determined by an examination of the two factors discussed in Gertz, determines
which of the competing interests will be deemed more weighty. See Nimmer, supra note 54,
at 942-45 (defining definitional balancing and comparing ad hoc balancing); see also Phil-
lips, Defamation, Invasion of Privacy, and the Constitutional Standard of Care, 16 SANTA
CLARA L. Rnv. 77, 79-80 (1976).
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ual from both public officials and public figures. The first is the greater
access to the media that is available to public officials and public
figures, which allows them to rebut the defamatory statement. 89 Be-
cause private individuals lack this remedy of self-help, the Court
thought that they are more vulnerable to injury and that the state inter-
est in providing them a remedy must be correspondingly greater. 90 The
second and more important factor is that public figures and public offi-
cials have "voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury
from defamatory falsehood concerning them."91
Although access to the press for purposes of rebuttal may at times
provide some vindication for a defamed plaintiff, the general effective-
ness of rebuttal in a defamation case was questioned by the Gertz Court
itself, and this factor was viewed by the Court as the less important of
the two.92 The primary rationale of the decision was the conclusion
that public figures have assumed an increased risk of defamatory com-
ment. This conclusion, which was not explained by the Court, is by no
means self-evident. Justice Brennan characterized it as "at best, a legal
fiction."93
Such a conclusion is justified in the context of the limited-purpose
category. An individual must have voluntarily entered into a contro-
versy, and the protection offered his or her critics extends only to
speech pertaining to that controversy.94 This rationale also supports
giving protection to critics of famous or notorious people, as long as the
criticism pertains to activities voluntarily placed in the public eye. If
an individual is well known as a result of success in his or her profes-
sion, especially if that profession is one in which success regularly gen-
erates publicity, a strong argument can be made that the added risk of
defamation is an occupational hazard that has been assumed along
with the benefits. To extend the argument further, however, stretches
the concept of voluntary exposure beyond its logical limits.
The Gertz majority believed that the Rosenbloom standard gave
more protection to defendants than was actually required to protect the
first amendment interests involved in libel cases, with the result that
89. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 344.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 344-45.
92. "Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo harm of defamatory
falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is rooted in our experience that the truth rarely
catches up with a lie." Id. at 344 n.9.
93. Id. at 364. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403
U.S. 29, 48 (1971)).
94. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 351.
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legitimate state interests were unjustifiably restricted. 95 Under the
Gertz analysis, it is the strength of the state interest, reflected by the
status of the plaintiff, that determines the level of protection appropri-
ate in a given case. Thus, even though a purposive view of the first
amendment would not require protection merely because of the plain-
tiff's fame, the Court believed that fame was "a compelling normative
consideration" indicating that the plaintiff had relinquished some of
the state interest in reputation, and that imposing the burden of the
Times standard was justified.96
To assess the validity of this assumption underlying the category,
it is necessary to examine the scope of the more common limited-pur-
pose public figure category. An examination of the Supreme Court
cases interpreting that category reveals that its scope has been increas-
ingly narrowed. The Court has placed increasing emphasis on actual,
voluntary participation by the plaintiff in a public controversy.
Time, Inc. v. Firestone,97 the first public figure case decided by the
Court after Gertz, involved an erroneous report that a court had
granted plaintiffs husband a divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and
adultery. In fact, the divorce was granted on grounds of "lack of do-
mestication," and no finding of adultery was made by the court.98
Mrs. Firestone was a prominent member of society in Palm Beach,
Florida, and had called several press conferences to discuss the divorce
proceedings. The Court, in a 5-3 decision, rejected the argument that
Mrs. Firestone was a public figure.
The Court first dismissed any claim that Mrs. Firestone was a pub-
lic figure for all purposes, saying she "did not assume any role of espe-
cial prominence in the affairs of society, other than perhaps Palm
Beach society. . ... ,99 Second, she was not a public figure for a lim-
ited purpose, since she had not thrust herself to the forefront of a public
controversy in order to influence its resolution. 100 The Court refused to
equate "public controversies" with all controversies of interest to the
public, saying that to do so would be to return to the Rosenbloom pub-
lic interest test.'01 The Court also stressed that Mrs. Firestone's partici-
pation in the divorce proceedings was not voluntary in any realistic
95. See id at 346.
96. See id at 344; see also Note, Defamation and the First Amendment: Protecting
Speech on Public Issues, 56 WASH. L. REv. 75, 84 (1980).
97. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
98. Id. at 450-5 1.
99. Id. at 453.
100. Id. at 453-55.
101. Id. at 454.
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sense. 102
The Firestone decision narrowed the scope of the public figure test.
The all-purpose category was largely unaffected, except for the implica-
tion that the plaintiff's fame must be more than local in magnitude to
justify imposition of such status. 0 3 Two requirements were added to
the limited-purpose category. First, the controversy must be signifi-
cant, and second, the plaintiff must have voluntarily attempted to influ-
ence the outcome of the controversy.10 4 In addition, these
requirements may have implicitly abolished the concept of an involun-
tary public figure.'0 5 This narrowing trend was continued in cases sub-
102. Id.
103. Mrs. Firestone was a prominent and active member of Palm Beach's "sporting set,"
id. at 485 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So.2d 745, 751 (Fla.
1972)), and the Court conceded that she may have been especially prominent in Palm Beach
society. Yet the Court held she did not occupy a role of especial prominence that would
make her a public figure for all purposes. Id. at 453-55.
It may be that the Court based this holding not on the amount of fame possessed by
Mrs. Firestone but on the lack of power and influence that she possessed. The Court used
the portion of the Gertz opinion that referred to persons occupying a position of "persuasive
power and influence," id. at 453 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345
(1974)), rather than the reference to those having achieved "pervasive fame or notoriety,"
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 351. If this is the case, the all-purpose category is
perceived by the Court as being more narrow than some lower courts have viewed it. See
infra notes 144-58 & accompanying text.
104. The Court's interpretation of the Gertz public controversy requirement raises some
interesting issues. The Court refused to equate "public controversies" with "all controver-
sies of interest to the public," saying that Gertz had rejected such a subject-matter test.
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454. Divorce proceedings were not the sort of public
controversy Gertz was referring to. "The details of many, if not most, courtroom battles
would add almost nothing toward advancing the uninhibited debate on public issues
thought to provide principal support for the decision in New York Times." Id. at 457.
In Gertz the majority repudiated the Rosenbloom standard because it did not believe
that judicial inquiry into the legitimacy of interest in a subject or event was appropriate.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 346. The Court's interpretation of "public contro-
versy" in Firestone, however, requires the same inquiry, a fact which was noted by Justice
Marshall. "The meaning that the Court attributes to the term 'public controversy' used in
Gertz resurrects the precise difficulties that I thought Gertz was designed to avoid." Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 487 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
It would seem that as hard as the Court has tried to avoid the use of a public interest
test, it is unable to formulate a standard that does not to some extent employ such a test.
After Firestone, each of the categories of public figure defined in Gertz involves to some
extent a public interest test. In the case of the all-purpose public figure, the interest is in the
plaintiff; in the case of the limited-purpose figure, there must be involvement in a contro-
versy of legitimate interest to the public. By purporting to reject such a test while simultane-
ously employing it, the Court is causing confusion in an area of law that desperately needs
consistency of adjudication. See infra notes 146-57 & accompanying text.
105. See Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone. A Study in Constitutional Policy Making, 61
MINN. L. REV. 645, 662-63 (1977); Comment, The Evolution of the Public Figure Doctrine in
Defamation Actions, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 1009, 1021 (1980).
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sequently decided by the Court.
Hutchinson v. Proxmire10 6 involved an award by Senator William
Proxmire of his "Golden Fleece of the Month Award" to several gov-
ernment agencies that had funded Dr. Hutchinson's study of emotional
behavior. Dr. Hutchinson sued Senator Proxmire, alleging that the
press releases which accompanied the award had damaged his profes-
sional and academic reputation.107
Defendants argued that Dr. Hutchinson was a public figure be-
cause he had actively sought funding from the federal government, was
a widely known author in his field, and had been employed at various
public institutions. They argued that he had voluntarily participated in
a general public controversy concerning wasteful or potentially waste-
ful government spending. 0 8
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, held that Dr.
Hutchinson was not a public figure. The Court found that Dr. Hutch-
inson had not thrust himself or his views into a public controversy in
order to influence others, noting that no particular controversy had
been identified by the respondent.1°9 The Court stressed that Dr.
Hutchinson's activities did not amount to an invitation of public atten-
tion and comment." 0 In addition, the only controversy involved was
the result of the libelous statement, and the Court rejected the idea that
"those charged with defamation [may]. . . , by their own conduct, cre-
ate their own defense by making the claimant a public figure."'
In Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association,112 decided with Hutchin-
son, the plaintiff had been involved in an investigation of Soviet espio-
nage in the United States that took place during the 1950's. In January
of 1957 Wolston received a subpoena directing him to appear before a
federal grand jury in New York City. Wolston responded to several
such subpoenas, but failed to appear at one hearing, claiming mental
depression made it impossible for him to make the trip. He pled guilty
to a citation for contempt receiving a one-year suspended sentence and
106. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
107. Id. at 114.
108. Id. at 134-35.
109. "Respondents have not identified such a particular controversy; at most they point.
to concern about general public expenditures. But that concern is shared by most and re-
lates to most public expenditures; it is not sufficient to make Hutchinson a public figure."
Id. at 135.
110. Id. at 135.
111. Id.
112. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
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three years of probation. 13 These events were reported in fifteen news-
paper stories in New York and Washington, D.C., but the publicity
soon died down and Wolston returned to his normal, private life. Wol-
ston was never indicted for espionage.
In 1974, Reader's Digest Association, Inc. published KGB, The Se-
cret Works of Soviet Agents, which described Soviet espionage activi-
ties since World War 11.114 Wolston was identified in the book as a
Soviet agent. 115 Both the district court"16 and the court of appeals" 7
found Wolston to be a public figure for the limited purpose of comment
on Soviet activities in the United States. The Supreme Court reversed.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion focused primarily upon the lack of a
voluntary role played in the controversy by the plaintiff. "A private
individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure just by
becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public
attention."1 8 Once again, the Rosenbloom test was expressly rejected:
"A libel defendant must show more than mere newsworthiness to jus-
tify application of the demanding burden of New York Times."' 19
These cases have developed a more restrictive test for the limited-
purpose public figure than Gertz outlined. This test consists of four
parts. First, the Court examines the subject matter of the defamatory
statement and decides the threshold question of whether it involves a
matter of legitimate public concern.'20 Second, the Court determines
whether it is actually a controversy, i.e. a matter of debate and disa-
greement. 121 Third, the Court considers the plaintiff's actions in rela-
tion to the identified controversy to determine whether the plaintiff was
involved in the controversy prior to the defamatory publication. 2 2 Fi-
nally, the Court considers whether the plaintiff actually took a stand in
the controversy or was only associated with it involuntarily. 123
Each of the public figure categories set forth in Gertz rested on the
113. Id. at 162-63.
114. Id. at 159.
115. Id.
116. 429 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977).
117. 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
118. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 167.
119. Id. at 167-68 (citation omitted).
120. See supra note 104 & accompanying text; see also Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publica-
tions, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Note, Wolston and Hutchinson: Changing
Contours of the Public Figure Test, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 179, 194-95 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Changing Contours]; Note, supra note 48, at 175.
121. See, Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d 1287, 1296-97 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
122. Id. at 1296.
123. Id. at 1297. See Note, Changing Contours, supra note 120, at 194.
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same distinctions: assumption of the risk of defamation and access to
the press.'2 The tendency of the Court in subsequent cases to require
evidence of voluntary, purposeful action on the part of the plaintiff
seems to indicate that the Court is unwilling to automatically equate
involvement in an event of interest to the public with a relinquishment
of reputational interests.
This interpretation of the limited-purpose category may signal that
the all-purpose category should be narrowly applied. In most in-
stances, any connection between the fame of the plaintiff and an actual
relinquishment of the interest in an unsullied reputation is tenuous at
best. The Court's insistence on voluntary, purposeful action in the lim-
ited-purpose context should be viewed as implying a similar limitation
on the all-purpose context. Comment relating to areas not voluntarily
placed in the public eye logically should not be afforded first amend-
ment protection under the Gertz rationales. One court has reached a
similar conclusion, holding that "under the principles now applied by
the United States Supreme Court, one does not become a public figure
simply because of general public interest in one's lifestyle and personal
activities or because one's job happens to be one in which widespread
publicity is given to outstanding performers."'125 The logic of the ratio-
nales underlying the Gertz public figures categories requires that the
fame of the plaintiff give rise to public figure status only when that
fame results from voluntary, purposeful activity on the part of the
plaintiff, and then only in cases where the defamatory comment was
directed at that activity.
Comment directed to the private life of a famous plaintiff should
not receive protection under the logic of Gertz. Not only is such com-
ment unrelated to any voluntary assumption of the risk of defamation,
but the primary motivation of the Gertz opinion argues against such
protection. The majority in Gertz rejected Rosenbloom because Rosen-
bloom failed to give sufficient consideration to the state interests in-
volved in defamation cases.126 In a case involving the plaintiffs private
life, the legitimate state interest in protection of privacy rights, as well
as reputational interests, is involved.
124. See supra notes 49-50 & accompanying text.
125. Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 116, 593 P.2d 777, 787 (1979). See also Brief for
Respondent Wheeler at 17, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (stressing lack of
voluntary assumption of the risk of defamation).
126. See supra notes 95-96 & accompanying text.
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The Right of Privacy
Although the idea that an individual has a right to retain control
over certain parts of his or her life is quite old, 127 privacy as a legal
concept is a comparatively recent phenomenon in American law.'
28
Some protection of privacy was provided by pre-nineteenth century li-
bel law, 129 but the origin of a viable legal theory of privacy is generally
attributed to an article written in 1890 by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis. 30 In recent years the right of privacy has attained constitu-
tional status and, in a variety of forms, has become entrenched in the
tort law of most states.
The concept of privacy as a constitutionally protected right has
been limited to protection of the most intimate areas of life from gov-
ernmental intrusion. 131 Federal courts generally have rejected attempts
to expand constitutional protection to include the wider areas protected
by tort law. The extent to which the constitutional right of privacy will
develop remains unclear, 132 but a strong argument can be made that
when defamatory comment pertains to an area of life that is protected
from governmental intrusion, the involvement of such an interest
should have an effect on the balance struck in Gertz. 13 3
The first recognition of a state cause of action based solely on in-
vasion of privacy occurred in 1905.134 Since then it has been adopted
as a common law right in a majority of states. 35 Among the rights
typically protected by state privacy law are the right of freedom from
public disclosure of information about one's private affairs, and the
right of freedom from publication of false, nondefamatory statements,
127. Glancey, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 17-21 (1977).
128. See generally Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 253 (1966); Glancey, supra note 127; Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383
(1960); Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962).
129. D. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 161 (1979).
130. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 5 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
131. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 331 U.S. 479 (1965). The
constitutional right of privacy has been characterized as involving two interests, an individ-
ual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and an interest in independence in
making certain important decisions. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977).
132. "If there is anything 'obvious' about the constitutional right to privacy at the pres-
ent time, it is that its limits remain to be worked out in future cases." Roe v. Ingraham, 480
F.2d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.).
133. See infra text accompanying notes 120-26.
134. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
135. There is a common law right of privacy in at least 37 states. Only three states have
rejected the right. See R. PHELPS & E. HAMILTON, LIBEL, RIGHTS, RISKS, RESPONSIBILITIES
382-83 (1978).
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publication of which would be offensive to a reasonable person.136 It is
not uncommon to find both a privacy claim and a defamation claim
arising from the same utterance. 137
Privacy in the Balance
The right of privacy and freedom of expression must at times
clash. The right to determine what information about one's self will
become public is often antithetical to the public's need for information.
When these rights collide, the right of free expression generally
prevails. But the interests in a free press and free speech may at times
be outweighed by other societal interests.' 38 The right of privacy and
reputational interests are both such societal interests.139
Gertz balanced the interest in reputation against the right of free
expression without differentiating between speech pertaining to a plain-
tiffs public affairs and speech pertaining to his or her private affairs.
Yet comment upon one's own intimate affairs intrudes upon a right so
important in our society that it has been afforded constitutional protec-
tion from governmental intrusion.14° When a right is deemed so fun-
136. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 809-14.
137. See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977); Hotchner v. Castillo-
Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Wade, supra note 128, at 1121. It has been
suggested that a public figure who has been defamed as to a private area of life may be left
to remedies available under the law of privacy. Note, supra note 48, at 175 n.123. An at-
tempt to vindicate privacy rights in an action for invasion of privacy that arises from facts
that would also give rise to a defamation action will generally meet many of the same obsta-
cles as would a defamation suit. If the plaintiff alleges a "false light" invasion of privacy, see
generally W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 812-14, he or she must prove that the false statement
was made knowingly or recklessly if a matter of public interest is involved. Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In addition, it has been held that the California retraction statute
applies to false light as well as defamation actions. See Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193
Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1961); see also Kapellas v. Kaufman, 1 Cal.3d 20, 459
P.2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969). Another California Court of Appeal case, Grimes v.
Carter, 241 Cal. App. 694, 50 Cal. Rptr 808 (1966), dismissed a plaintiff's intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress and privacy claims for failure to post a bond required in defama-
tion claims. The court held that plaintiff could not escape the bond requirement when the
classic elements of slander were present. Id. at 702, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 813 (citing Werner).
138. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
139. "In its societal impact a system of privacy is vital to the working of the democratic
process. Democracy assumes that the individual citizen will actively and independently par-
ticipate in making decisions and in operating the institutions of the society. An individual is
capable of such a role only if he can at some point separate himself from the pressures and
conformities of collective life." T. EMERSON, supra note 74, at 546. Reputational interests
arguably rise to an even higher level. "Certainly the enjoyment of one's good name and
reputation has been recognized repeatedly in our cases as being among the most cherished of
rights enjoyed by a free people, and therefore as falling within the concept of personal 'lib-
erty."' Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976).
140. See supra note 131.
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damental as to gain constitutional protection, it would seem that the
state has a valid interest in protecting its citizens from private abroga-
tions of that right. This interest, which is more broadly manifested by
the common law of most states, was not considered by the Gertz Court
The addition of such a factor to the Gertz scales, however, could re-
quire a different result. 4 1
When a defamatory publication refers either to areas of life inti-
mate enough to be given constitutional protection or to the broader
areas of private life protected by state tort law, the factors deemed con-
trolling in Gertz have less applicability than in situations involving
comment on public matters. Equating fame with an assumption of the
risk of defamation is highly implausible when the defamatory comment
pertains to personal matters that the plaintiff has not in fact offered for
public scrutiny. Such a tenuous equation is a weak justification for
subjecting a plaintiff to the burden of the Times standard.
The second factor mentioned in Gertz, access to the press, is also
an inadequate justification in such a situation. In addition to the dubi-
ous effectiveness of rebuttal as a remedy for defamation, 142 it is plain
that further publicity would only add to the harm caused by the inva-
sion of privacy rather than remedy it.143
In the case of a defamatory invasion of privacy, then, the interests
which should be balanced are different than those considered by the
Gertz Court. On one side of the scale, the factors that were relied upon
in Gertz are less weighty. On the other side is not only the legitimate
state interest in protecting reputation, but an equally legitimate state
interest in protecting the plaintiffs privacy. With the balance thus al-
tered, there is strong justification for allowing the plaintiff recovery
without requiring a showing of recklessness.
Unguided Decisionmaking in the Lower Courts
Because of the nature of the Gertz opinion, with its "broad rules of
general application," the lower courts have not been provided with ad-
equate conceptual guidelines in public figure cases. The Gertz case re-
141. The Court has recognized that privacy interests might outweigh first amendment
rights in a case where otherwise private information that was false, even though not defama-
tory, was published. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975). Such a
result would seem even more likely when both privacy and reputational interests are added
to the scales.
142. See supra note 88.
143. "Reply is clearly no substitute for uninvaded privacy." Phillips, supra note 88, at
87. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-14, at 650-51 (1978).
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stated the concept created in Butts and Walker, discussing it only
briefly. The Court has not, in Butts, Walker, or Gertz, explained
clearly who is a public figure and why. The two characteristics of the
public figure, access to the media and voluntary assumption of the risk
of comment, do not furnish concrete guidelines applicable to specific
fact situations.' 44 This is especially true in cases involving the all-pur-
pose public figure, since no Supreme Court case has held a plaintiff to
be such a figure. Lower courts thus are provided only minimal gui-
dance and are not able to compensate by analogizing the facts in their
cases to those of a Supreme Court case.
Lower courts have interpreted the scope of the all-purpose cate-
gory as being quite wide, generally not requiring a famous plaintiff to
have either power or influence. Some courts have held that public
figures include "artists, athletes, business people, dilettantes, anyone
who is famous or infamous because of who he is or what he has
done."' 145 Others have rejected the notion that fame or publicity alone
can make one a public figure. 146
Courts that have found public figure status based on fame alone
have generally not required a relationship between the source of that
fame and the defamatory comment at issue. For example, in Cochran
v. Indianapolis Newspapers,147 the publication at issue described plain-
tiff, appearing as a witness in an investigation of policy corruption, as
wearing "provocative attire." This description was preceded and fol-
lowed by references to a grand jury investigation of illegal sex activi-
ties, leaving the implication that plaintiff was involved in that
investigation as well. Plaintiff had been a Playboy "Playmate" and had
won a beauty contest at the Indianapolis "500." The court, in dicta,
found plaintiff to be a public figure under Butts, with no examination
of whether she realistically could be said to have invited comment such
as that involved in the case. 148
144. Robertson, supra note 82, at 223.
145. Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines and Broadcasting, Inc., 392 F.2d 412, 419 (9th Cir.
1968). See also Montandon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 186 (1975); Williams v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).
146. Compare Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) (professional
football player a public figure for purposes of alleged defamatory statement relating to foot-
ball injury) with Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 593 P.2d 777 (1977) (professional horse
trainer not a public figure); and compare Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976)
(wealthy socialite, well-known locally, not a public figure) with Cochran v. Indianapolis
Newspapers, Inc., 175 Ind. App. 548, 372 N.E.2d 1211 (1978) (dictum finding former Play-
boy "Playmate" a public figure for purposes of comment unrelated to her fame).
147. 175 Ind. App. 548, 372 N.E.2d 1211 (1978).
148. Id. at 557, 372 N.E.2d at 1219. The public figure determination was unnecessary to
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In cases involving publication of defamatory statements pertaining
to private areas of life such as the marital relations or health of the
plaintiff, courts have found public figure status without any considera-
tion of the additional state interest in protecting privacy rights. A good
example of such a case is Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co. 149 Mrs.
Brewer had been an entertainer and singer from the early 1950's until
her marriage in 1964. Her career was confined largely to the Memphis
area. For a period of five or six years, ending around 1960, Mrs.
Brewer had been involved in a romantic relationship with Elvis Pres-
ley. In 1957, he had referred to her as his "number one girl," a remark
which generated some nationwide publicity, including articles in Time
and Life magazines.1 50 After her marriage, Mrs. Brewer retired and
did not seek media attention.' 5'
In 1972, the defendant published an article which stated that Mrs.
Brewer had visited Presley in Las Vegas, referred to their earlier rela-
tionship, and described the meeting as a "reunion."' 152 The article said
that the plaintiffs were divorced, and the tone of the article suggested
that the reunion was a romantic one.' 53 The Brewers, in fact, remained
happily married, and Mrs. Brewer had not been in Las Vegas.
The Fifth Circuit reversed a district court judgment for the Brew-
ers, holding them to be public figures because of Mrs. Brewer's fame.
Because the press had covered both her career and her romance with
Presley, "thereby advancing her career," '' 54 and because her name con-
tinued to appear in stories about Presley, 55 the press was entitled to
protection in commenting on her career and her relations with Presley.
Because he was married to Mrs. Brewer, Mr. Brewer had to meet the
burden of the Times standard as well.156
Although the Brewer case did involve comment on Mrs. Brewer's
the court's decision because Indiana law requires application of the Times standard in all
cases involving matters of public interest. Id. The Cochran court used Butts as its standard
for determining public figure status. Another court has found that the standards for deter-
mining who is a public figure have changed since Butts: "[W]e cannot reconcile the
Supreme Court's holding that Butts was a public figure with the standards later enunciated
in Gertz and Time, Inc. v. Firestone." Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 108, 593 P.2d 777, 787
(1979).
149. 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980).
150. Id. at 1248.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1240.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1257-58.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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relationship with Elvis Presley, it also involved comment on the
Brewer's marital relationship. Marital relations were characterized by
the Fifth Circuit in another case as "activities of an essentially private
nature in which the public has no, or at most marginal, legitimate inter-
est."' 157 This is particularly true with reference to Mr. Brewer's suit, for
it can hardly be said that one invites comment upon the intimate details
of one's marital relationship by marrying one's spouse. Yet the court
did not consider what effect, if any, the involvement of such a private
area of life should have had on the outcome of the case.
158
It is not suggested that the outcome of such cases would necessar-
ily be different if factors such as privacy interests and the relationship
of the source of plaintiffs fame to the defamatory comment were taken
into account by the courts. It is important, however, that the courts do
not appear to be considering such factors. The lack of careful analysis
and consistent decisionmaking is particularly troubling in these cases
because the very nature of the interests involved demand such consis-
tency. A public figure standard can do little to prevent a chill on free-
dom of expression if the press cannot be reasonably certain of who will
be considered a public figure.
Conclusion
The all-purpose public figure concept, nebulous in scope and un-
supported in any realistic way by the rationales advanced to justify it,
reflects a basic problem inherent in the Supreme Court's libel decisions.
The disagreement over the proper role of the first amendment in libel
cases, and over the meaning of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, has led
to the development of a constitutional standard that contains internal
contradictions. The Gertz case purported to focus on the activities of
the plaintiff, and to reject the Rosenbloom test of public interest. The
standards developed in Gertz, however, include a category of public
figure which is based essentially on the amount of interest shown by the
public in the plaintiff's activities and is so broad in scope that no actual
voluntary action on the part of the plaintiff is necessary. While this
apparent contradiction can be explained on the ground that focusing
on the plaintiff's fame does not require judges to decide what issues are
157. Resanova v. Playboy Enter., 580 F.2d 859, 861 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978).
158. See also Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977). In Meeropol, the court
found the children of Julius and Ethel Rosenburg to be public figures "for all purposes and
in all contexts." Id. at 1006. The court also dismissed a privacy claim on statutory grounds.
Id. at 1068. The court did not consider whether the privacy interests involved should affect
the public figure analysis.
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of public interest, but only to decide if the public has in fact shown
interest in the plaintiff, the focus on the fame of the plaintiff tends to
provide overbroad protection to defendants while furthering no im-
portant first amendment interests. In addition, in some cases the use of
the Gertz all-purpose category will result in the improper infringement
of the plaintiff's privacy interests.
Similar problems have been apparent in the Supreme Court deci-
sions following Gertz, which have interpreted the nature and scope of
the limited-purpose public figure. While purporting to reject the sub-
ject-matter analysis of Rosenbloom, these cases have focused on the na-
ture of the controversy involved and whether it was sufficiently
"legitimate" to justify protection. These cases have led some commen-
tators to conclude that the test for the limited-purpose public figure
now includes a threshhold requirement that the matter be of public
interest.159
Because the right of free expression has been interpreted to include
not only the individual's right to speak but also the public's right to
receive information, 60 it would seem a difficult task to develop a stan-
dard intended to preserve such freedoms without including some form
of public interest analysis. It may be that the all-purpose category was
intended to preserve, in a restricted form, the beneficial aspects of Ro-
senbloom. As a vehicle for such a purpose, however, it is ill-suited and,
more importantly, offers the potential for the undermining of a primary
purpose of New York Times and Gertz: the protection of speech.
As presently interpreted by some lower courts, the all-purpose cat-
egory has the potential to be used as a catch-all for courts that feel a
defendant should receive first amendment protection but cannot justify
giving that protection on the basis of the plaintiff's activities. 161 Such a
decision would essentially be ad hoc, thus undermining the Gertz
Court's attempt to lay down broad rules of general application. Be-
cause the deciding court in such a situation would be restricted to
manipulating the Gertz factors to justify its decision, however, the fac-
tors unmentioned in Gertz would not be considered and the advantages
of ad hoc decisionmaking would be lost as well.
A rule of decision is inadequate if a court applying it is faced with
a choice between sacrificing theoretical consistency to obtain what it
159. See supra note 120.
160. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
161. For the view that legal rules often serve only to justify a decision based on factors
such as emotional responses, see J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 55-57 (1949). Obviously, a
rule that is broad in scope and of uncertain limits more readily lends itself to such use.
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views as a just result (thereby creating dangerous precedent) or sacrific-
ing a just result by mechanical application of the rule. The possibility
of such a situation arising in the area of defamation law is particularly
unacceptable. "The very purpose of the rule announced in New York
Times. . . requires courts to articulate clear standards that can guide
both the press and the public." 162 The Supreme Court should accept
for review a case that raises some of the issues discussed, for the pur-
,pose of clarifying the law.
If the use of a public figure standard is to continue in defamation
cases, the involvement of the public interest should be clarified, per-
haps by openly requiring that the matter at issue be of public interest as
a threshold requirement. The distinction between types of public
figures should be eliminated, and the determination of the status of a
plaintiff should be made by focusing on the actual activities of the
plaintiff. Rather than attempting to decide whether the plaintiff is
"pervasively famous" or merely "locally famous,"' 63 courts should con-
162. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
163. The standard for determining whether an individual is a public figure for all pur-
poses requires clear evidence that he or she possesses general fame or notoriety in the com-
munity and is pervasively involved in the affairs of society. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 352 (1974). In discussing Gertz's status, the Court noted that none of the prospec-
tive jurors knew who Gertz was, and that no proof was offered that this was atypical of the
local population. Id. Other than this the Court offered no guidelines as to the requisite
amount of fame or the community involvement.
In Firestone, the Court noted that Mrs. Firestone did not assume a role of prominence
in society, "other than perhaps Palm Beach society. . . ." Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448,453 (1976). This would seem to suggest that more than merely local fame or notoriety is
required for all-purpose public figure status. No further guidance has been given by the
Court, however.
Fame of a truly national scope, such as Johnny Carson's, has not posed much of a
problem for the courts. Such plaintiffs tend not to litigate the issue of public figure status.
See, e.g., Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976); Buckley v. Littell, 394 F.
Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Fame such as Mrs. Brewer possessed, characterized as national
in scope by the court, Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1248 (5th Cir.
1980), but perhaps more realistically confined to Elvis Presley fans and Mrs. Brewer's own
local following, poses more of a problem.
In Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Faulkner, 372 So.2d 1282 (Ala. 1979), the Supreme
Court of Alabama found an extremely active member of the Democratic Party, who was a
former member of the state senate and twice a candidate for governor, to be a public figure
for all purposes, defining the relevant community as the state of Alabama. Id. at 1285.
DeCarvalho v. daSilva, 414 A.2d 806 (R.I. 1980), involved a lawyer who was the Portugese
Consul to Rhode Island for ten years, later appointed Honorary Consul, and was in general
very active in the Portugese community in Rhode Island. The Supreme Court of Rhode
Island found that the plaintiff was a "pervasive public figure" in the Portugese community in
Rhode Island, id. at 813, a community of from 70,000 to 100,000 persons. Both Faulkner
and DeCarvalho arguably are inconsistent with the holding that Mrs. Firestone was not a
public figure for all purposes, even though she may have achieved especial prominence in
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centrate on determining whether the defamatory comment pertains to
an area of life placed by the plaintiff in the public eye. If the plaintiff
has sought to attract the public interest, whether in connection with a
profession, business venture, or in an attempt to influence public opin-
ion on an issue, he or she can legitimately be said to have assumed the
risk of resulting comment. In addition, the plaintiff has, by placing the
matter in the public eye, given up any claims to privacy as to the partic-
ular matter. Conversely, even a famous plaintiff will retain any rights
of privacy she or he may have in regard to matters not placed before
the public.
The proposed solution would, in Justice Powell's words, "reduce
the public-figure question to a more meaningful context by looking to
the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular
controversy giving rise to the defamation.' 64 The resulting test not
only logically relates to the primary rationale of Gertz, but also gives
recognition to the legitimate state interest in protecting privacy. In ad-
dition, it would provide guidance to lower courts and reduce the poten-
tial for inconsistent adjudication in an area where consistency is of
paramount importance.
James Corbelli*
Palm Beach society. See also Steere v. Cupp, 226 Kan. 566, 602 P.2d 1267 (1979) (attorney
active in county political and social life held to be a public figure for all purposes).
164. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
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